Backbone

Essay · from No. 02, Shipping Container

The Patents Malcom McLean Gave Away

Drafted by AI from the episode script of Backbone No. 2, "The Shipping Container: Nobody Touches the Cargo".

There is a letter dated January 29, 1963, in which Sea-Land, the shipping company Malcom McLean built, releases its patents on the corner fitting of a shipping container and on the twistlock that plugs into it. Royalty-free, so that the rest of the industry could use the designs and change them.

On its face this is a strange thing for McLean to have done. He was a trucker from Maxton, North Carolina, who had spent twenty years thinking about cost. He had sold the trucking company he built from one used truck in order to put everything into ships, and when someone asked whether he had hedged, he said, "You've got to be totally committed." The corner was his company's own patented design. And the request came out of the same standards committee that had just declared his boxes the wrong size.

To see why he said yes, it helps to know how little of the container's story is about the container.

On April 26, 1956, at Port Newark, New Jersey, a crane set fifty-eight truck trailer bodies, wheels removed, on a deck welded on top of an old tanker called the Ideal X. Loading a ship that size by hand normally took something like a week. This took a single working day. The ship was McLean's, and a senior official of the longshoremen's union who watched it load is said to have answered, when asked what he thought, that he'd like to sink it. He had reason. Two years earlier, in 1954, the National Academy of Sciences had followed one ordinary freighter, the Warrior, across the Atlantic and counted 194,582 separate pieces of cargo, every one lifted by hand, and found that handling them at the two ends cost about three times as much as sailing the ship. That handling was his members' work.

But McLean was not the first person to put freight in a box. In 1917 a man in Cincinnati named B. F. Fitch was lifting truck bodies on and off railcars. The Pennsylvania Railroad opened what has been called the world's first container terminal in 1932. The Army shipped steel boxes to Korea in the early fifties. Five months before the Ideal X, a railroad in the Yukon launched a ship often described as the first built specifically to carry containers, and it ran between Vancouver and Skagway for ten years.

Every one of those worked, mechanically. None of them changed anything, because each was a box by itself. Fitch's boxes fit Fitch's trucks. The Army's fit the Army.

A man who had already learned this once was Keith Tantlinger, an engineer at a trailer company in Spokane, Washington. In 1949 he designed a thirty-foot aluminum container for a barge line running freight from Seattle to Alaska. His company built two hundred of them, and then there were no repeat orders. He is said to have put it later as something like: everybody was interested, but nobody wanted to reach for his pocketbook. In 1955 McLean hired him to run engineering, and the corner Tantlinger designed that year is the part this story turns on.

A container's walls are a skin. They keep out the rain and the thieves. The strength is in a steel post at each of the four vertical edges, and at the top and bottom of every post there is a hollow cast-steel block with an oval hole in it. A twistlock, a steel cone with a head on it, drops through the hole and turns ninety degrees so that it cannot come back out. Those same eight corners lock a box to the box beneath it on a ship, to a truck chassis and to a railcar, and they are how the crane picks it up. Every crane, truck and ship that will ever handle the box grabs it there. So the size of the box turned out to be almost the easy part to agree on. The corner was the one part that had to be identical on every box.

By the early sixties nothing was. McLean's boxes were thirty-five feet long, because that had been the longest trailer legal in every state. Matson, which ran freight between California and Hawaii and had studied the question carefully enough to publish its analysis in an academic journal, used twenty-four. Another company, Grace Line, used seventeen. None of them fit each other's ships or each other's cranes.

In 1958 the U.S. Navy looked at this and got nervous. In a war it might have to use those commercial ships, and with every company's boxes a different size it could not mix them or swap cranes. The Navy and the federal Maritime Administration pushed the industry toward a standard, and a national committee got going. Width was easy: eight feet, because that is what the highway rules allowed. Length was the fight. Forty feet was the railroads' number, the classic boxcar length. Then, in 1959, a number of states raised their trailer limits to forty feet, and thirty-five lost its reason to exist. In 1961 the committee settled on ten, twenty, thirty and forty.

Neither pioneer's size was on the list. Sea-Land and Matson together were carrying something like seventy percent of America's container traffic, and the standard said both of their fleets were wrong.

Neither company accepted it, and it is hard to blame them. They were the two that had actually built the thing, and each had chosen its size for a sound reason: one to fit its trucks, the other to fit its trade. They went to Washington and lobbied, and Congress changed the law so that the standard sizes would not get preference for government business. The committee, for its part, does not seem to have been out to get anybody. The longtime chairman of the international committee wrote later that the mismatch "was not a wilful effort to isolate the two pioneering companies." It was what came of building something that had to work everywhere and not only on two routes. A former Sea-Land executive was blunter: "Twenty and forty foot was never the right size." It did not have to be right. It had to be the same. The pioneers paid for that. Sea-Land and Matson ran non-standard fleets for years, and Sea-Land eventually had to convert ships to fit.

The corner was harder. By 1962 there were two designs on the table. One was Tantlinger's, from 1955, on which Sea-Land held a patent. The other came from a company called National Castings and was built, as Tantlinger put it, to skirt around that patent. The rival design was rejected because it was not proven and not cost-competitive. Sea-Land's was proven, but a standards committee basically will not make a patented part the national standard and have everyone who builds a box pay one company a royalty.

Tantlinger no longer worked for Sea-Land. He had left in 1958 for Fruehauf, the big trailer maker, and he was now chairing the committee's task force on exactly this question. He later described the process as a dog fight. So he went back to his old boss and asked him to give the corner away, and McLean said yes.

It is tempting to read that as generosity, and maybe some of it was. But a container is worth more the more places it fits. Had Sea-Land kept its corner proprietary, its boxes would not have fit anyone else's cranes, no one else's boxes would have fit its ships, and the whole network would have stayed small. An economics firm that studied the decision put it plainly: McLean was not acting out of altruism. He saw that opening the patent would make the whole market bigger. One of his old executives said McLean "decided it was better to give up those patents and grow the industry rather than keep them as a proprietary item," and called it the most important decision ever made in the containerization and intermodal industry.

The letter did not settle things. In 1964 Tantlinger presented the design at an international meeting in Hamburg, before the United States had even approved its own standard at home, and handed out half-scale models of the fitting so people could see how it worked. In 1965, at The Hague, it was accepted unanimously. Then the fittings went into service and turned out not to be strong enough, and the committee met again in Genoa in 1966 and ordered thicker, stronger castings. The international standards body approved the corner fitting in June 1967, and the size standard was published the next year. A few years after Sea-Land's release, another trailer company released a twistlock patent of its own.

So the corner on a container today is not exactly McLean's corner. The committee changed it and strengthened it. What his release did was break the deadlock and let a proven design become the starting point.

By 1990, something like ninety-eight percent of the dry containers on earth conformed to the international size standard. Singapore opened its first container terminal in 1972 and ten years later was the busiest port in the world by shipping tonnage. Its real business is moving boxes from one ship to another, which only works if every box fits every crane.

None of this means that giving things away always wins. Apple ran its own proprietary port on the iPhone for about a decade and made a lot of money controlling who could make accessories, until the European Union passed a law that made it switch. Owning a standard can pay, for a while.

Still, people had been building boxes for decades, and nothing happened. Tantlinger had watched it happen to two hundred of his own. A container is worth something only when everyone uses the same one, so what it needed was agreement. On size, that took a national committee and a standard that left both pioneers out. On the corner, it took a letter dated January 29, 1963, from the company that held the patents.


Backbone is researched and written with AI agents and voiced by AI versions of Jeff's and Cyrus's own voices. A host reviewed this essay before it was published.

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